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Talking about modularity and decentralisation in economics is a surprisingly
difficult task and involves going into the very heart of the nature of institutions
governing economic life. As reported e.g. in Hurwicz (1971), the discussion dates
back at least to Plato defending central planning in the 5HSXEOLF and Aristotle
warning against the dangers and disadvantages of collective ownership. Far from
the presumption to directly join a discussion with these big names of Western
thought, we present a model and some results dealing with how well different
institutional settings, characterised by different degrees of decentralisation, perform
as backgrounds for distributed problem solving.
The main focus of our work is on solving problems whose solution derives
from coordinating a large number of interacting and interdependent entities which
altogether contribute to forming a solution to the problem itself. The key issue and
difficulty addressed here is the opacity of single entities’ functional relations and
the partial understanding of their context-dependent individual contributions in
forming a solution to the problem at hand. Our model accounts for the relationships
between problem complexity, task decentralisation and problem solving efficiency.
The issue of interdependencies and of how they shape search processes in a
space of solutions is also faced in Kauffman's NK model of selection dynamics in
biological domains with heterogeneous interdependent traits (Kauffman (1993)).
Kauffman's approach to the exploration of a fitness landscape, however, does not
necessarily fit well with the realm of social evolution. The main reason for this
inadequacy is that social actors might well engage in adaptive walks based on a far
richer and virtually huge class of algorithms other than single bit mutations alone
considered by Kauffman.
In particular, following Simon (1983), our focus is on those problem solving
strategies which decompose a large problem into a set of smaller sub-problems that
can be treated independently by promoting what we have come to call a division of
problem solving labour. Searches in the problem space based on one bit mutations
amount to fully decompose the problem into its smaller components, while coarser
decompositions correspond to mutating more bits together. In this work we study
some general properties of decompositions and the effect of adopting mutational
algorithms of any size on the exploration of a fitness landscape.
Imagine, for instance, a 1-dimensional problem. Adopting a point-mutation
algorithm corresponds to exploring the space of configurations by flipping
elements' values one at a time. A point-mutation algorithm corresponds, in our
view, to a maximally decentralised search strategy in which each of the 1 bits
forming the problems will be given a value independently from all the other 1-1
bits. In this sense the whole problem is (trivially) decomposed into the set of the
4smallest-sized sub-problems. On the other hand, the same problem could be left
totally undecomposed and a search algorithm might be adopted which explores all
the 1 dimensions of the problem. This strategy corresponds to mutating up to all
the 1 components of the problem at a time. Between the finest and the coarsest
decompositions, all the other possible decompositions of the problem lie (i.e. all
the possible algorithms of any cardinality), each corresponding to a different
division of labour.
The division of problem solving labour, as we shall see in greater detail, to a
large extent determines which solutions will be generated and then eventually
selected. This leaves the possibility open that never will the optimal solution be
generated and a fortiori selected, as it might well be that never it will be possible to
reach it starting from a given decomposition of the problem. It thus turns out that
while decomposing a problem is necessary in order to reduce the dimension of the
search space, it also shapes and constrains a search process to a specific sub-space
of possible solutions thus making it possible for optimal solutions not to be ever
generated and for systems to be locked into sub-optimal solutions.
We believe that the main significance of our work is casting some further
doubts on any “optimality through selection” argument from a specific point of
view. Evolutionary arguments in economic theory have often taken a rather
Panglossian form according to which the sole existence of, say, an organisational
form or of a technological design can be reliably taken as a proof of its optimality.
The view according to which market forces are always able to select away
suboptimal types is a widely accepted idea in economic theory. It is also
noteworthy that most of the historically grounded attempts to show the limits that
selection encounters in the economic realm are grounded on a claim to some sort of
weakness of selective pressures.
A famous example is Paul David's work on the persistence of the highly
inefficient QWERTY keyboard in typewriters and computers. In his seminal work,
David (1985) shows how a technological standard adopted for its efficiency in a
given set of constraints (those imposed by mechanical typewriters, with the need to
reduce the frequency of lever jams) was not displaced by standards which had
become far superior when those constraints had totally disappeared (in electric
typewriters and then computers, where the keyboard layout could be freely
designed in order to make more easily accessible the most frequently struck keys).
However, the case discussed by David deals with a situation in which the “optimal”
configuration exists and is actually available as a possible choice but selective
pressures are not strong enough to favour it over the others.
Quite on the contrary, our focus is on those cases in which the optimal
alternative is not available at all as a consequence of a particular way of exploring
a landscape and of a specific accessibility relation between solutions that holds as a
consequence of the adopted search algorithms. In our approach, these
considerations are highlighted by the fact that exploring a landscape according to
5different decomposition patterns implies that the very geometry of the fitness
landscape changes and a landscape that is very rugged when explored with a one
bit algorithm might become smooth when explored with an algorithm of greater
cardinality.
Many authors in the field of theoretical biology emphasise how many
evolutionary asymmetries such as patterns and processes of phenotypic evolution,
punctuated evolution, developmental constraints, homology and irreversibility do
not naturally fit with evolutionary theories as implemented in the neo Darwinian
paradigm as it is purely based on (heritable) diversity generation and selection.
An approach that we regard as particularly consonant with our own is that
proposed by Stadler HWDO (2000). In this essay, the authors emphasise the quest for
a theory of accessibility between structures in terms of a precise theory of
genotype-phenotype maps and claim that the aforementioned asymmetries are in
some way rooted in the structure of the map itself and are nothing but “statements
about the accessibility topology of the phenotype space” (Stadler et al. 2000). This
way of looking at things, in a sense, relates to the idea that accessing or
constructing a structure (say a phenotype or a technological design or a solution to
a combinatorial problem) by means of a set of variational mechanisms is logically
and empirically prior to any selective pressure and of its outcomes.
We thus take the perspective according to which asymmetries in selection and
evolution are not solely dependent on selective pressures plus the structure of
fitness landscapes but rather on accessibility relations between objects as defined
and grounded on specific mutational operators that allow the exploration of a
solution space by transforming objects into new objects. Once again, what can be
reached from what is highly dependent on some notions of neighbourhood and
distance which, as we shall precisely see, are prior and independent from any bare
fitness consideration.
The problem of accessibility in current economic theory is approached (and
radically solved) in a most clear way whose main effect is making the problem
disappear. Basically, both for individual consumers and producers, solution spaces,
that is the space of consumption and that of production bundles, are imagined to be
uniformly, symmetrically and everywhere accessible so that a continuous path can
always be imagined to exist connecting every and each point in those spaces.
Expressed in this terms, our main focus is on seriously considering the tangled
(though neglected) interaction between economic interaction as such and
organisational structures and constrains adopted to complement ambiguous market
signals.
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Lionel Robbins (1935) defined economic theory to be “the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between given ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses”.
Focussing on “scarcity” and “alternative uses” will give us the possibility of
articulating a brief overview on the realm and character of economic theory and of
its approach towards the problem of modularity.
That resources are not unlimitedly available to us  and that limits to their
utilisation force us to allocate them among mutually alternative uses are facts that
surround each of us experience and everyday life. These two facts taken together
imply social forms of competition for resources in order to endow oneself with the
possibility of using them.
To the end that competition be mediated and efficiently organised, a system is
needed that rules competition for resources and helps in efficiently allocating them
to different possible utilisations. The “system” can be thought to be, for instance,
an authoritarian one (such as in a military state or in a dictatorship) or a
decentralised one such as a market.
Adam Smith emphasised that some form of societal or interpersonal
organisation is needed in order to exploit the advantages of co-operation and social
interaction. In particular, Smith observed that individuals are different, have
different “talents” and, at the same time, skills and capacities of individuals in
pursuing their ends increases with specialisation.
To this end, trade and division of labour are necessary so that a butcher is not
forced to live his lifetime on meat and he can exchange meat for bread with a baker
who, in turn, will get his own advantage from the exchange.
Economic theory has among its aims that of studying the properties of the
outcomes resulting from different and alternative societal organisations. In order to
tell a better system from a worse one, economists rely on the notion of Pareto
efficiency: whatever we mean by “better” or “efficient”, we surely mean that a
system or a particular allocation is better than another one if no individual
perceives it as a worse one and at least one individual perceives it as a better one.
That is: there is no allocation in which everyone would prefer to find himself in.
Leaving aside any reference to a (fairly big) set of assumptions that economic
theory relies on, the very heart of the theory is the proof that efficiency so defined
can be reached thanks to a specific societal system: the price system. The working
of the system can be roughly described as follows. Goods are transferred and an
income derives from selling them at given prices. Income is in turn utilised to buy
other goods at given prices.
The general idea is that in a setting in which everyone tries to maximise its
own welfare and utility, it naturally happens, given certain rather specific
hypotheses, that the whole body of a society comes to a point in which a
7remarkable degree of coherence shows among a number of different and sparse
decisions to sell and buy different commodities. Coherence here means a state in
which markets “clear” and supply equals demand for every commodity. To be
slightly more precise: with a few (though very strong) assumptions on individual
rationality it is possible to show the existence of an equilibrium. That is, for a given
economy it is possible to find a vector of prices and an allocation to each individual
such that the excess demand function of the economy is zero for every good.
Pressures and information coming from markets are what turn selfish
behaviours into socially desirable outcomes. Both pressures and information are
represented and implemented by the price system whereby prices reflect the
relative scarcity of commodities. So, what happens according to this picture of the
economic world is that economic interaction takes place through individual agents
reacting (i.e. adjusting demand and supply) to quantitative information coming
from the market.
The faith in the possibility and capacity for markets to reach a coherence state
in which different and possibly conflicting actions are compensated is crucially
based, on the one hand on strong notions of individual and collective rationality
and, on the other hand, on a most clearly cut distinction between individual agents
and institutional contexts. The latter (i.e. the rules and the “places” in which
individual interaction lives) are assumed to be given before any interaction takes
place and as either totally transparent to individuals or irrelevant at the level of the
theory. In other words, given that a class of hypotheses are met on individual
rationality, on collective rationality and on how the latter is grounded on the
former, “equilibrium analysis” postulates that every dynamic trajectory of an
economy leads to an equilibrium state.
As a matter of fact, an ex-ante definition of interaction structures and
institutional contexts amounts to grounding markets' compensation possibilities on
issues and factors that are independent from economic interaction itself. Not only:
the sharp separation between economic agents and the contexts they interact in and,
at the same time, the very fact that these be given before and independently from
their interactions entails that agents are imagined as perfectly “adapted” to their
environment and that, vice versa, interaction structures are perfectly suited, or
either irrelevant, to any task at hand. The only relevant thing is the transparency of
institutional contexts and settings and the fact that prices accurately reflect all the
relevant information. This consideration will be the first cornerstone of our
argument and the starting point of our analysis.
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Even from our rather sketchy description of economic life as depicted by
orthodoxy, it is fairly evident how a strong and most peculiar notion of modularity
8underlies the whole thing. The main tenet of this approach is indeed representing
economic agents as autonomous and anonymous individuals which take decisions
independently from one another and that interact only through the price system. So,
all the relevant information is encapsulated within individual economic agents and
coordination is achieved within markets by the use of prices, i.e. by pure selection.
One of the most fundamental questions asked by economic theory (and by
welfare economics in particular) is about the extent to which perfect competition
can lead to an optimal allocation of resources. Among the assumptions made by the
theory in order to derive such results is that never must indivisibilities show up in
consumption nor in production.  The key problem here, and the main relevance of
this point for our discussion, is that a decentralised coordination mechanism based
on prices is no longer available when indivisibilities show up .
Classical results of welfare economics on the possibility of decentralisation
heavily rely on an assumption of perfect decomposability of the underlying
allocation problem. The proof of one of the most important results of welfare
economics, the Second Welfare Theorem, critically depends on a separation
argument and the same proof no longer holds in the presence of externalities, i.e.
interdependencies which lead to social interactions not mediated through the
market: in the presence of one of the most fundamental instances of non-
separability.
In the picture of economic life described so far, every actor is an “island” for
any given set of prices. In particular, never is his utility affected by choices made
by other actors apart from those choices - i.e. decisions to buy or sell marketable
goods -  which have a direct reflection on prices. Externalities, on the other hand,
are exactly those situations in which actions taken from others might well affect the
outcome of ours but do not affect prices and thus cannot be coordinated through the
action of markets. An ideal “orthodox” market ceases to work as perfectly as
prescribed by the theory as soon as externalities are present. It is not by chance that
those situations related to their presence are referred to as “market failures”.
This idea of a sort of perfect modularization of an economy is pushed to its
extreme by the so-called Coase theorem (cf. Coase (1937)). In spite of its name
Coase's theorem is rather a circular argument and states that if every single activity
which affects agents' welfare can be exchanged and allocated in a perfectly
competitive market then non-separability ceases to be a problem. For instance,
consider an externality, say a factory which produces plastic buckets and in doing
so pollutes the environment and negatively affects the welfare of people living
nearby. The problem exists because while the socially optimal amount of buckets
to be produced can be determined in the perfectly competitive market for buckets,
on the contrary the socially optimal amount of pollution cannot be determined
because a market for that does not exists. But if that is the problem the solution - at
least in principle - can be very easy: create a market for pollution rights and then
9they will be allocated in a socially optimal way as every other good1. In order to
have such a market we need to allow buckets and pollution to be allocated
independently from each other, by establishing negotiable property rights on
pollution rights and allow them to be traded in a competitive market separated from
the one in which buckets are traded. In the language of modularity we could say
that the problem of externalities arises because we are working with modules that
are too large, thus the solution is to disassemble them and let market selection
operate on finer units.
When interpreted in terms of degrees of correlation or, to use the biological
terminology, in terms of degrees of epistasis, the Coase theorem asserts that, under
a set of rather weak assumptions, in any situation the degree of interdependence
can always be made minimal. The relevance of property rights in our discussion
lies in the fact that with the modularization of property rights we modularise social
interaction which then come to be mediated through the interface of voluntary
exchange.
In particular, the theorem can be read as saying that every tangled situation
can be transformed into one whose degree of granularity is the atomistic one
prescribed by the theory, that is: a degree in which every atomic entity is properly
encapsulated and bears no correlation with other entities. It is this degree that
solely allows competitive  markets to perfectly work as decentralised
(atomistically)-modular mechanisms.
In a sense Coase’s argument could pose an apparently odd but perhaps not so
absurd question to biology: if selection is such a powerful device of coordination,
adaptation and optimization, why do we observe so little of that? In particular, why
is selection applied to rather large ensembles of modules and not to each module
separately in order to exploit its power to optimize each module? In other words,
why do we observe multi-functional complex living creatures and not much
simpler entities specialised in single tasks and coordinated through selection?
Thus we are left with two analogous questions: in biology one could ask why
multi-functional complex organisms exist, as in economics we do ask the question:
why do firms exist? Is it just because, as Coase would say, there is a cost associated
with the use of the price system, i.e. with the imperfections of the (market)
selection mechanism (that Coase calls transactions costs)? And if transaction costs
are the costs of a bad modularization, what could possibly go wrong with a totally
atomistic modularization?
Adopting a Panglossian attitude (which is fairly common in Economics)
Coase might well imagined to assert that in the absence of transaction costs, rights
(modules) cut too thin or too coarse will quickly reassemble or disassemble into
                                                
1
 As Coase himself stresses, in many cases this solution holds only in principle. In reality
there might exist many reasons for which the creation of such a market is difficult, costly or
even impossible. These reasons are called transactions costs.
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optimal bundles. The starting point of this kind of analysis would be imagining a
completely atomistic, modular and market-based way of production, consumption
and economic interaction (i.e. the finest possible decomposition of economic
activities). Williamson (1975) well epitomises this view with the position
according to which “in the origins there were markets”. A possible explanation for
non separable organisations is what we might call the “non-monotonicity of
marginal productivity”. An example is Alchian and Demsetz (1972) discussion on
team-work which illustrates how some  instances of coordination problems require
kinds of transmission of information well beyond what can be sent through the
interface of the price system.
We might thus argue that organisations arise as a non modular response to the
fact and the need for non-price mediated interactions among different modules
(whatever they be). An organisation is always a demodularisation and a
repartitioning that limits the right of alienation from at least some rights of
decision.
In addition, the view of economic systems as ideally or in principle organised
around a minimal level of granularity is clearly confuted by a straightforward
observation of the existence and importance of economic entities - such as business
firms - whose grain is much coarser than the one prescribed by a theory which
praises the virtues of decentralisation.
Actually, the most part of economic life occurs in forms and structures that go
largely beyond the atomistic limits envisaged from orthodox economic theory. As
recognised by many economists, a large part of economic life occurs in
organisations composed of a large number of entities which are not regulated nor
coordinated by the price system. Within organisations, other coordination
mechanisms rule activities, such as hierarchies, power or authority.
Surprisingly enough, economic theory has not much to say on organisations
as such. It rather assimilates them to the same action structure of individual agents
and very little room is devoted in economic textbooks to an analysis of how, for
instance, different organisational structures might differ in performance, efficiency
or speed of adaptation. The most general questions with respect to the
organisations/markets opposition are: what is that determines the boundaries
between markets and organisations? And what is the real difference between what
happens in a market and what happens in an organisation?
In this sense, Coase's main concern can be thought to be about the way
negotiation can repair externalities and interdependencies.  His argument is broader
though and can be so reformulated: if nothing obstructs efficient bargaining, then
people can negotiate until they reach Pareto efficiency. So, after all, it might well
seem that the well functioning of a competitive market is a matter of finding the
right "granularity", the level that ensures individual interaction to be as effective as
to reach optimal outcomes.  After all, the ultimate meaning of the Coasian
argument is: coordination is always achievable via market mechanisms provided
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that the "granularity" of the system is fine enough to encompass all atomic entities
and a proper market exists (or is created) for all of them.
“Granularity” will be a big issue in our discussion. With this term, we refer,
on the one hand, to the level of analysis adopted by economic theory (i.e. studying
consumers' and firms' behaviour as individuals and postulating that each and every
phenomenon occurring at the aggregate level can be traced back to individual
actions and behaviours). On the other hand, we straightforwardly refer to economic
reality and we ask why it has settled at the actual level of aggregation: why are
there firms producing goods and not people buying raw materials and building the
objects they need by themselves? Why are there a multitude of firms rather than a
single huge one?  And how are new markets created? In other words: why and how
has economic life settled at the present level and degree of organisation?
With respect to these points, we will argue that the two main forces that drive
the whole process are integration and disintegration processes. These two historical
forces we regard to be the ultimate reasons for economic reality having settled into
the present level of aggregation. We will further maintain that integration and
disintegration processes are the two main economic forces that contribute to the
creation of new economic entities. With respect to this point, it is worth pointing to
the fact that even from a historical perspective (painting it with an extremely broad
brush, of course) the evolutionary path undertaken by capitalist economies has
been one in which new-born technologies, productive processes, commodities and
whole industries and markets enter the scene in highly integrated settings (see
Langlois and Robertson 1989 and Klepper, 1997 for a detailed discussion). It is
only at successive stages that a finer grained organisation of, say, production takes
place  thus creating new markets, new specialised functions and further division of
labour. Also note that Adam Smith himself referred to this theme stressing how one
of the main reasons for the development of productive capacities is to be found in
specialisation deriving from finer grained divisions of labour.
Causes and mechanisms by which new entities are created and enter the
economic scene are not at the centre of economic theory as we know it. The
problem was stressed by Joseph Schumpeter who pointed out that the real
phenomenon that should surprise and interest economists is not how a firm is run,
but rather how it got created. It thus seems that economics is affected by the same
“object problem” (see Fontana and Buss, 1994) that plagues biology as we know it
by the modern synthesis. This is not surprising as we realise that economic theory
was born with a strong faith in the possibility of applying the main tools and
abstractions of dynamical system theory to the domain of social interaction. This
has driven this discipline to take the existence of its very objects and the nature of
their dynamical couplings as given and immutable from the very start, thus
committing itself to purely quantitative and non constructive analyses and theories.
Transaction cost economics and principal-agent theories have partly tried to fill this
gap but, we believe, missing a bunch of fundamental points.
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Transaction cost economics has developed an explanation of vertical
integration in strictly Coasian terms (actually, just expanding upon Coasian ideas).
According to this explanation "in the beginning there were markets": there was
full, atomistic modularity and integration phenomena, viewed as processes of
assembling modules, took place whenever the working of the price system was
bound to face comparatively higher costs than those associated with, say,
bureaucratic governance. Firms exist because of greater allocative efficiency. This
kind of explanation leave unexplained a class of most relevant phenomena and
seems to be contradicted by a fairly large class of evident, though neglected, facts.
First of all it conflicts with the historical development of technologies and
industries which have mostly developed according to a path going from initial
states of high vertical integration to a progressive disintegration. It is also worth
pointing out that it is the very process of division of labour that possibly creates
opportunities for new markets to exist.
Secondly, it should be pointed out that both logical arguments and empirical
evidence exist to support the view that markets, far from being an original state of
nature, require some sets of conditions to be met in order to emerge, some of which
are even determined by explicit forms of organisational planning.
Thirdly, it is usually implicit in many of transaction cost based approaches
that efficiency can be considered as an explanation for existence. That is: proving
the relative greater efficiency of an organisational form is in some way considered
to be an explanation of its emergence. Actually, it might well be true that selection
forces are strong enough to select fitter structures: but these have to exist to be
selected: in Fontana and Buss terms, they must arrive before being selected. So,
selective forces can and do account for a population’s convergence to a specific
form but not for the existence and emergence of such a form.
In addition, we know that when the entities subject to selection are entities
whose internal structure and components present a strong degree of
interdependence their selection landscape will be correspondingly rugged and
uncorrelated thus possibly making selection forces unable to drive such entities to
global optima. It then follows that selective forces may not be strong enough as to
select sub-optimal structures out (hence providing an at least partial explanation for
the persistent diversity of organisational forms).
We thus ask: can optimal organisational structures and division of labour
patterns emerge out of decentralised interactions? We show this to be possible only
in some very special conditions and, at the same time, we prove that
decentralisation has usually an associated cost in terms of sub-optimality.
Our second fundamental question will be about the “necessary” character of
the actual grain of the economic world. What would we see if we run twice the tape
of economic history? Could other evolutionary paths have been taken by the
development of economic history? Or, rather, there are some fundamental
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properties that we would be bound to see at every run of the evolutionary tape? Is it
true that evolution leads to increasing modular structures in the economic realm?
2XUWDVNDKHDG
In the rest of the paper we analyse some of the issues raised above by means
of a very sketchy and abstract model. We analyse the properties of adaptive walks
on N-dimensional fitness landscapes by entities which decompose the N
dimensions of the problem into modules and adapt such modules independently of
each other. Thus inter-modular coordination is performed by selection mechanisms
which we assume to be "perfect" in the economic sense (i.e. not subject to any
friction, inertia, or any other source of transaction cost).
In the next section we develop a methodology which determines, for any
given landscape, its smaller "perfect" decomposition, that is the set of the smallest
modules which can be optimised by autonomous adaptation with selection. Then,
in section 3, we extend this methodology to near-decompositions, i.e.
decompositions which, in a Simonian sense, isolate into separate modules only the
most fitness-relevant interdependencies. We show that such decompositions
determine, in general, a loss of optimality, but sharply increases the speed of
adaptation. Section 4 uses such methodologies to build landscapes whose
decompositions and near-decompositions are known and simulate competition
among entities which search the landscape with algorithms based on different
decompositions. This enables us to test the evolutionary properties of different
decompositions.
Finally we provide some, still very tentative, hints to possible directions in
which our model can be generalised in order to account for variable representations
of the landscapes. There can hardly be any doubt that social institutions do face
problems whose structure is not exogenously given, but they base themselves on
socially constructed representations of the problem. Such representations are
subject to change, through processes of social, organisational and technological
innovation, which provide new representations of existing problem or new
problems not considered before. Probably such changes in representations occur
also in the biological realm, though on much longer time scale. In the final section
we briefly discuss how our model could be extended to account for changing
representations of the landscapes. We show that the representation of the structure
of interdependencies can be modified at will, in particular highly interdependent
worlds can be made fully decomposable by appropriate representations and
viceversa. This also allows us to cast some doubts on the general usefulness of
Kaufmann’s K value as an appropriate measure of the complexity of a landscape
and we present an example of a problem with a high K but fully decomposable.
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’HFRPSRVLWLRQDQGFRRUGLQDWLRQ
3UREOHPVDQGGHFRPSRVLWLRQV
We assume that solving a given problem requires the coordination of 1
atomic elements, which we call generically components, each of which can assume
some number of alternative states. For simplicity, we assume that each element can
assume only two states, labelled 0 and 1. Note that all the properties presented
below for the two-states case can be very easily extended to the case of any finite
number of states.
More precisely, we characterise a problem by the following three elements:
1. the set of FRPSRQHQWV: { }
1
[[[ ,.....,, 21=ℵ , with }{ 1,0∈L[
2. the set of FRQILJXUDWLRQV: { }1[[[; 221 ,......,,=   where a FRQILJXUDWLRQ, that
is a possible solution to the problem, is a string L
1
LLL [[[[ .....21=
3. an RUGHULQJ over the set of possible configurations: we write ML [[ ≥ (or
ML [[ > ) whenever L[ is weakly (or strictly) preferred to M[ .
In order to avoid some technical complications, we assume for the time being
that there exists only one configuration which is strictly preferred to all the other
configurations (i.e. a unique global optimum). This simplifying assumption will be
dropped in section 4 below.
A SUREOHP is defined by the couple ; ≥ , and solving it amounts to
finding the ;[ L ∈  which is maximal according to ≥ .
As the size of the set of configurations is exponential in the number of
components, whenever the latter is large, the state space of the search problem
becomes much too vast to be  extensively searched by agents with bounded
computational capabilities. One way of reducing its size it to decompose2 it into
sub-spaces:
                                                
2
 A decomposition can be considered as a special case of search heuristic: search heuristics
are in fact ways of reducing the number of configurations to be considered in a search
process.
≥
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Let }{ 1,,...3,2,1=ℑ  be the set of indexes, and let a EORFN ℑ⊆
L
G  be a non-
empty subset of it, and let 
L
G  be the VL]HRIEORFN
L
G  i.e. its cardinality3.
We define a GHFRPSRVLWLRQVFKHPH (or simply GHFRPSRVLWLRQ) of the space
ℵ as a set of blocks:
{ }
N
GGG’ ,....,, 21=  such that  ℑ=
=
U
N
L
L
G
1
Note that a decomposition does not have necessarily to be a partition (blocks
may have non empty intersections).
Given a configuration L[ and a block 
N
G , we call EORFNFRQILJXUDWLRQ
( )
N
M G[  the substring of length 
N
G  containing the components of configuration
M[  belonging to block 
N
G :
NL
M
N
M
N
M
NN
M GN[[[G[
NG
∈=   allfor     .....)(
21
We also use the notation ( )
N
M G[
−
 to indicate the substring of length 1_GN|
containing the components of configuration [M not belonging to block GN :
NL
M
N
M
N
M
NN
M GN[[[G[
NG1
∉=
−
−
  allfor    .....)(
21
Two block-configurations can be united into a larger block-configuration by
means of the ∧  operator:
( ) ( ) ( ) otherwise.  and  if            where
KKLKKMLML
\]GK[]GG]G\G[ =∈=∪=∧
We can therefore write ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N
M
N
M
N
M
N
MM G[G[G[G[[ ∧=∧=
−−
  for any GN.
We define the VL]H RI D GHFRPSRVLWLRQ VFKHPH as the size of its largest
defining block:
{ }
  max 21 NGGG’ =
A decomposition scheme and its size are important indicators of the
complexity of the algorithm which is being employed to solve a problem:
 - problems which can be successfully solved adopting the finest grained
according to the scheme D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} have minimum complexity,
while a problem which cannot be decomposed has maximum complexity and it can
only be searched extensively;
                                                
3
 We intend to use intra block as a proxy for hierarchy or centralised organisation and inter
block as a proxy for market or decentralised interaction.
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- a problem which can be decomposed according to the scheme
D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} can be solved optimally in linear time, while a problem
which cannot be decomposed can be solved optimally only in exponential time;
- but, on the other hand, a problem which has not been decomposed can
always be solved optimally while, as it will be shown below, a problem which has
been decomposed according to the scheme D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} - or for that
matter according to any scheme whose size is smaller than N – can be solved
optimally only under some special conditions, which, as we will show, become
generally – though with important exceptions - more and more restrictive as the
complexity of the problem increases and the size of the decomposition scheme
decreases.
Thus there is a trade-off between complexity and optimality for which we will
provide a precise measure in the following.
6HOHFWLRQDQGFRRUGLQDWLRQPHFKDQLVPV
We suppose that coordination among blocks in a decomposition scheme takes
place through market-like selection mechanisms, i.e. there are markets which select
at no cost and without any friction over alternative block-configurations.
More precisely, assume that the current configuration is [Mand take block GN
with its current block-configuration ( )
N
M G[ . Consider now a new configuration
( )
N
K G[  for the same block, if:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N
M
N
M
N
M
N
K G[G[G[G[
−−
∧>∧
then ( )
N
K G[  is selected and the new configuration ( ) ( )
N
M
N
K G[G[
−
∧  is kept
in the place of [M, otherwise ( ) ( )
N
M
N
K G[G[
−
∧  is discarded and M[  is kept.
It might help to think in terms of a given structure of division of labour (the
decomposition scheme), with firms or workers specialised in the various segments
of the production process (a single block) and competing in a market which selects
those firms or workers whose characteristics give the highest contribution to the
overall production process.
We can now analyse the properties of decomposition schemes in terms of
their capacities to generate and select better configurations.
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6HOHFWLRQDQGVHDUFKSDWKV
A decomposition scheme is a sort of template which determines how new
configurations are generated and can therefore be tested by market selection. In
large search spaces in which only a very small subset of all possible configurations
can be tested, the procedure employed to generate such new configurations plays a
key role in defining the set of attainable final configurations.
We will assume that boundedly rational agents can only search locally in
directions which are given by the decomposition scheme: new configurations are
generated and tested in the neighbourhood of the given one, where neighbours are
new configurations obtained by changing some (possibly all) components within a
given block.
Given a decomposition scheme { }
N
GGG’ ,....,, 21= , we define the following:
A configuration L
1
LLL [[[[ ....21= is a SUHIHUUHG QHLJKERXU – or, shortly, a
QHLJKERXU –  of configuration M
1
MMM [[[[ ....21=  for a block ’GK ∈  if:
ML
K
M
Y
L
Y
ML
[[
GY[[
[[
≠
∉∀=
≥
   3.
        2.
        1.
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two configurations differ only by
components which belong to block 
K
G .
According to the definition, a neighbour can be reached from a given
configuration through the operation of a single market selection mechanism.
We call ),(
LL
G[+  the VHWRIQHLJKERXUV of a configuration [ for block GL.
The VHW RI EHVW QHLJKERXUV ),(),(
LLLL
G[+G[% ⊆ of a configuration [ for
block GL is the set of the most preferred configurations in the set of neighbours:{ }  ),(    such that    ),(),(
LLLLLL
G[+]]\G[+\G[% ∈∀≥∈=
By extension from single blocks to entire decomposition schemes, we can
give the following definition of neighbours for a decomposition scheme:
U
N
L
LL
G[+’[+
1
),(),(
=
=  is the VHW RI QHLJKERXUV of configuration [ for
decomposition scheme ’
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We say that a configuration [ is a ORFDO RSWLPXP for the decomposition
scheme ’ if there does not exist a configuration ),( ’[+\∈ such that [\ > .
A VHDUFKSDWK – or, shortly, a SDWK – ( )’[3 ,δ  from a configuration [δ and
for a decomposition scheme ’ is a sequence, starting from [δ, of neighbours:( ) ( )’[+[[[[’[3 LL ,         with,....,,, 121 +++++ ∈= δδδδδδ
A configuration \ is UHDFKDEOH from another configuration [ and for
decomposition ’ if there exists a path 3[’ such that \∈3[’.
Suppose configuration [M is a local optimum for decomposition ’, we call
EDVLQ RI DWWUDFWLRQ ( )’[ M ,Ψ  of [M for decomposition ’ the set of all
configurations from which [M is reachable:
( ) ( ){ }’\3[’\3\’[ MM ,  with  , such that   ,),( ∈∃=Ψ
A EHVW QHLJKERXU SDWK ( )’[ ,δΦ  from a configuration [δ and for a
decomposition scheme ’ is a sequence, starting from xδ, of best neighbours:( ) ( ) ’GG[%[[[[’[
KK
L
K
L ∈∈=Φ +++++   and  ,         with,....,,, 121 δδδδδδ
The following proposition states that reachability of local optima can be
analysed by referring only to best-neighbour paths. This greatly reduces the set of
paths we have to test in order to check for reachability.
3URSRVLWLRQ : if α[  is a local optimum for decomposition ’ and is reachable
from δ[ , then there exist a best-neighbour-path leading from δ[  to α[ .
3URRI by hypothesis δ[  belongs to the basin of attraction ( )’[ ,αΨ  of α[ . Let us
order all the configurations in ( )’[ ,αΨ  by descending rank:
( ) { } 121   with  ,....,,, +++ ≥=Ψ [[[[[’[ αααα
Now proceed by induction on δ[ . If  1+= αδ [[  then, by definition, α[  must
be a best-neighbour of δ[  for a block in ’ (in fact, by hypothesis, α[  does not
have itself any strictly preferred neighbour). If 2+= αδ [[  then either α[  is a best
neighbour of δ[  or is not. In the latter case 1+α[  must necessarily be a best-
neighbour of δ[ . And so on…
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Now let [ be the global optimum4 and let ;= ⊆  be a subset of the set of
configurations with =[ ∈0 , we say that the problem ( )≥,;  is ORFDOO\
GHFRPSRVDEOH in Z by the scheme ’ if  ( )’[= ,0Ψ⊆ . If ;= =  we say that the
problem is JOREDOO\GHFRPSRVDEOH5 by the scheme ’.
Thus, according to the previous proposition, if the problem is locally
decomposable in Z there must exist a best-neighbour-path for decomposition ’
leading to the global optimum from every configuration in Z. If it is globally
decomposable such a path must exist from every starting configuration.
Among all the decomposition schemes of a given problem, we are especially
interested in those for which the global optimum becomes reachable from any
starting configuration. One such decomposition always exists, and is the degenerate
decomposition D={{1,2,3,....., N}} for which of course there exists only one local
optimum and it coincides with the global one. But obviously we are interested in –
if they exist – smaller decompositions and in particular in those of minimum size.
The latter decompositions represent the maximum extent to which problem solving
can be subdivided into independent sub-problems co-ordinated by market like
selection, with the property that such selection processes can eventually lead to
optimality from any starting condition. On the contrary, finer decompositions will
not in general (unless the starting configuration is “by luck” within the basin of
attraction of the global optimum) allow decentralised selection processes to
optimise.
The following proposition shows that there are problems which are globally
decomposable only by the degenerate decomposition D={{1,2,3,....., N}}:
3URSRVLWLRQ: there exist problems which are globally decomposable only by the
degenerate decomposition D={{1,2,3,....., N}}.
3URRI: we prove it by providing an example. Consider a problem whose globally
optimum configuration is the string 002
0
1
0
....
1
[[[[ =  and whose second best
                                                
4
 We remind the assumption of uniqueness of the global optimum.
5
 A special case of global decomposability, which is generalised here, is presented in Page
(1996) and is called dominance. In our terminology, a block configuration ( )NGK[  is
dominant when ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N
M
N
M
N
M
N
K G[G[G[G[
−−
∧>∧  for every configuration
( )
N
M G[
−
. That is when it is always preferred to all the other configurations of that block
irrespective of the configuration of the rest of the string.
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configuration is M
1
MMM [[[[ ....21=  where 1K[[ K
M
K
,...2,1   1 0 =∀−= . It is obvious
that the global optimum can be reached from the second best only by mutating all
components together, while any other mutation gives an inferior configuration.
The following proposition establishes a rather obvious but important property
of decomposition schemes: as we climb into the basin of attraction of a local
optimum for a decomposition D which is not the finest one, then finer
decomposition schemes can be introduced which allow to reach the same local
optimum.
3URSRVLWLRQ: let ( ) { }δααα [[[’[ ,...,,, 1+=Ψ  be the ordered basin of attraction
of local optimum α[ , and define( ) ( ) { } δδαααα ≤<Ψ=Ψ +++ L[[[’[’[ LLL 0for    ,....,,\,, 1 . Then if
D≠{{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} there exist an L such that for ( )’[L ,αΨ  a decomposition
D′≠D can be found with |D′|<|D|.
3URRI: If L  α[  is trivially reachable from α[  itself for all decompositions,
including the finest one D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}}.
Minimum size decomposition schemes can be found recursively with the
following procedure: let us re-arrange all the configurations in ;  by descending
rank { }1210 ,...,, −= 1[[[;  where 1+≥ LL [[ .
The algorithm can be described informally6 as follows:
1. start with the finest decomposition D0={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}}
2. check whether there is a best-neighbour path leading to x1 from xi, for
i=2,3,…2N, if yes STOP
3. if no, build a new decomposition D1 by union of the smallest blocks for which
condition 2 was violated and go back to 2.
Let us finally provide an example for illustration:
                                                
6
 The complete algorithm is quite lengthy to describe in exhaustive and precise terms. Its
Pascal implementation is available from the author upon request.
21
([DPSOH: the following table contains an hypothetical ranking (where 1 is the
rank of the most preferred) of configurations for 1=3
CONFIGURATIONS
RANKING
100 1
010 2
110 3
011 4
001 5
000 6
111 7
101 8
If search proceeds according to the decomposition scheme D={{1},{2},{3}},
there exist 2 local optima: 100 (which is also the global optimum) and 010. The
basins of attraction of the two local optima are respectively:
Ψ(100)= {100, 110, 000, 111, 101}
Ψ (010)= {010, 110, 011, 001, 000, 111, 101}
Note that the worst local optimum has a larger basin of attraction7 as it covers
all possible configurations except the global optimum itself. Thus, only a search
which starts at the global optimum will (trivially) stop at the global optimum
itself with certainty, while for 4 initial configurations search might end up in
either local optima (depending on the sequence of mutations) and for the
remaining 3 initial configurations search will end up at the worst local optimum
with certainty.
Using the notion of dominance (cf. Page (1996)) it is possible to find out that
the only dominant block-configuration is actually the globally optimum string
itself, corresponding to the degenerate decomposition scheme of size 3
D={{1,2,3}}. So apparently no decentralised search structure allows to locate
always the global optimum from every starting configuration.
Actually this is not true: also the decomposition scheme D={{1,2},{3}} allows
decentralised selection to climb up to the global optimum. For instance if we
start from configuration 111 we can first locate 011 (using block {1,2}) then
010 (using block {3}) and finally 100 (again with block {1,2}); or alternatively
we can locate 110 (using block {3}) and 100 (with block {1,2}). It can be easily
                                                
7
 Kauffman (1993) provides some general properties of one-bit-mutation search algorithms
(equivalent to our bit-wise decomposition schemes) on string fitness functions with varying
degrees of interdependencies among components. In particular, he finds that as the span of
interdependencies increases, the number of local optima increases too, while the size of the
basin of attraction of the global optimum shrinks.
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verified that the same blocks do actually “work” for all other starting
configurations. The algorithm just presented will find this decomposition.
1HDUGHFRPSRVDELOLW\
When building a decomposition scheme for a problem we have looked so far
for perfect decomposability, in the sense that we require that all blocks can be
optimised in a totally independent way from the others. In this way we are
guaranteed to decompose the problem into perfectly isolated components (in the
sense that each of them can be solved independently). This is very stringent a
requirement: even when interdependencies are rather weak, but diffused across all
components, we easily tend to observe problems for which no perfect
decomposition exists. For instance in Kauffman’s NK landscapes (cf. Kauffman
(1993)), already for such small values of K as 1 or 2 - that is for highly correlated
landscapes -  the above described algorithm finds only decomposition schemes of
size 1 or just below 1.
We can soften the requirement of perfect decomposability into one of near-
decomposability: we do not want the problem to be decomposed into completely
separated sub-problems, i.e. sub-problems which fully contain all
interdependencies, but we want sub-problems to contain only the most “relevant”
interdependencies while less relevant ones can persist across sub-problems. In this
way, optimising each sub-problem independently will not necessarily lead to the
global optimum, but to one of the best solutions8. In other words we construct
“near-decompositions” which give a precise measure of the trade-off between
decentralisation and optimality: higher degrees of decentralisation and market
coordination, and therefore higher speed of adaptation, can be obtained at expenses
of the optimality of the solutions which can be reached.
Let { }110 ,....,, −= µµ [[[;  with 120 −≤≤ 1µ  be the set of  the EHVW µ
FRQILJXUDWLRQV.
We say that ;µ is UHDFKDEOH from a configuration [ and for a decomposition D
if there exist at least one \∈;µ such that y is reachable from [.
We call EDVLQRIDWWUDFWLRQ ( )’; ,µΨ  of ;µ  for decomposition D the set of
all configurations from which ;µ is reachable.
If ( ) ;’; =Ψ ,µ  we say that D is a µGHFRPSRVLWLRQ for the problem.
                                                
8
 This procedure allows to deal also with the case of multiple global optima and thus we can
now drop the assumption of a unique global optimum.
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µGHFRPSRVLWLRQV RI PLQLPXP VL]H can be found algorithmically with a
straightforward generalisation of the above algorithm which computes minimum
size decompositions schemes for optimal decompositions.
The following proposition gives the most important property of minimum size
µ-decompositions:
3URSRVLWLRQ : if Dµ is a minimum size µ-decomposition, then |Dµ| is
monotonically weakly decreasing in µ.
3URRI: if µ=2N-1 then ;µ includes all configurations and it is trivially reachable for
any decomposition, including the finest Dµ={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} with |Dµ|=1. If
µ=1 ;µ includes only the global optimum, thus the size of the minimum size
decomposition is 1≤|Dµ|≤N. We still have to show that it cannot be |Dµ+1|>|Dµ|: if
this was the case ;µ could not be reached from ;µ for decomposition Dµ, but this
contradicts the assumption that ;µ is reachable from any configuration in ; for
decomposition Dµ
The latter proposition shows that higher degrees of decomposition and
decentralisation can be attained by giving up optimality and allows to provide a
precise measure for this trade-off. In order to provide an example we generated
random problems of size N=12 all characterised by |D|=12 (i.e. they are not
decomposable). The figure below shows the sizes of the minimum size
decomposition schemes as we vary the number µ of acceptable configurations
(average on 100 random landscapes).
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 6SHHG DQG DFFXUDF\ RI VHDUFK VRPH FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHV
The trade-off outlined in the previous section between decomposability,
reduction of complexity and speed of search on one side and optimality on the
other, enables us to discuss some interesting evolutionary properties of various
organisational structures competing in a given problem environment. The
properties and algorithms analysed in section 3 allow us to build problems which
can be decomposed with any decomposition scheme decided by the modeller. We
can thus run simulations where various organisational structures compete in finding
solutions to a problem whose characteristics are entirely controlled by the
experimenter.
In this section we briefly discuss how such simulations have been built and
the main results they produced9. First of all, in order to reduce the space of possible
decompositions we have supposed that only decomposition which are partitions of
the problem into sub-problems of the same size are possible and that only
organisational structures which fulfil this constraint are viable. For instance, if
N=12 (as in most simulations) only the following 6 decompositions, named after
their size, are possible:
                                                
9
 For reasons of space we can only give a short summary of all the simulations. Programs
and detailed results can be obtained directly from the author upon request.
)LJXUH1HDU’HFRPSRVDELOLW\
0
4
8
12
1 2 3 4 5 6
RIDFFHSWDEOHVROXWLRQV
6
L]
H
R
I
’
HF
R
P
S
6
FK
HP
H
25
D1= {{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6},{7},{8},{9},{10},{11},{12}}
D2= {{1,2},{3, 4},{5, 6},{7, 8},{9,10},{11,12}}
D3= {{1,2,3},{4,5,6},{7,8,9},{10,11,12}}
D4= {{1,2,3, 4},{5, 6,7, 8},{9,10,11,12}}
D6= {{1,2,3,4,5,6},{7,8,9,10,11,12}}
D12= {{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}}
Problems characterised by one of these decomposition schemes can be
created and populations of agents, each of which characterised by one of these
decomposition schemes, compete in a simple selection environment to find better
solutions. Such competition works as follows:
1. a problem is randomly generated whose minimum size decomposition scheme
is one of the 6 possible;
2. a population of agents is created: each agent is characterised by one of the 6
possible decomposition schemes and is located in a randomly chosen
configuration (normally we have used populations of 180 agents, 30 for each
possible decomposition scheme);
3. each agent picks a randomly chosen block and by mutating at least one and up
to all bits within such a block generates a new configuration: if the latter is
preferred to the previous one the agent moves to it, otherwise stays put;
4. at given time intervals, all the agents are ranked: the ones located on the worst
configurations are deleted from the populations and substituted by copies of the
agents located on the best configurations. Such copies inherit the same
decomposition scheme of the parent, but are positioned on a different,
randomly chosen, configuration.
Thus we have a selection environment in which decompositions compete and
are reproduced from an initial population in which 1/6 of the decomposition are the
“right” ones and the others are wrong.
The main results can be summarised as follows. First of all, it is not
necessarily the “right” decomposition which invades the population: as the size of
the right decomposition becomes big enough, agents characterised by
decompositions which are finer than the right one tend to prevail. In fact, only
agents with the right decomposition can find the global optimum wherever they
start from, but their search process is very slow and can be invaded by agent which
cannot reach the global optimum, but do indeed reach good local optima relatively
fast. Indeed potential optimisers can die out before they reach even good solutions.
This result is even stronger in problems that we could define “modular”, i.e.
characterised by blocks with strong interdependencies within blocks and much
weaker – but non-zero – interdependencies between blocks: in these problems
higher levels of decompositions can be achieved at lower costs in terms of sub-
optimality.
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In general, simulations show two persistent features, which are present in all
but the most simple (highly decomposable) problems: a persistent sub-optimality
and a persistent diversity of agents, both in terms of the configurations achieved
and in terms of the decomposition schemes which define them. This is the outcome
of the multiplicity of local optima which characterise environments with high
degrees of interdependencies (cf. Levinthal (1997)). Simulations tend therefore to
support the view that heterogeneity and sub-optimality of organisational structures
can indeed be a persistent feature of organisational evolution.
We have also run other simulations in which we have, at given intervals,
changed the current problem with one having exactly the same structure in terms of
decomposability, but with different, randomly generated, orders. This can be taken
as a condition of uncertainty: for instance consumers still have changing
preferences over a stable set of characteristics. Interestingly enough, it turns out
that even with totally decomposable problems, as the change of the order becomes
more frequent, the population is entirely invaded by agents characterised by coarser
and coarser decompositions, and at the limit by agents which do not decompose at
all. It seems therefore that growing uncertainty has similar consequences of
growing interdependency.
Finally, two more points are worth considering. First of all, higher degree of
decomposition allow the selection process to work effectively with less underlying
variety. Blocks of size k can be optimised by selecting upon 2k types of
individuals: as k grows the variety requirement becomes stronger and stronger and
thus less plausible.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that decentralised market coordination
mechanisms can indeed exploit the advantages of parallelism and increase the
speed of adaptation, but such parallelism can prevent important reductions of
complexity in systems composed by nested or overlapping subsystems10. Consider
as an example the extreme case of a problem which can be decomposed by nested
blocks as in D={{1},{1,2},{1,2,3},.....,{1,2,3,…,N}}. The size of such a
decomposition scheme is N and thus markets working in parallel will face a
problem of maximum complexity. However the problem would have minimum
complexity if it were solved according to the following sequence: first block {1}
can be optimised, then block {1,2} can exploit the optimal configuration of block
{1} and optimise only the second component, and so on… Note that, in order to
exploit such a reduction of complexity, a precise unique sequence must be
followed: it seems quite unlikely that it could spontaneously emerge starting from
isolated markets working in parallel.
We already mentioned that there exists a trade-off between speed of
increments and optimality, in that highly decomposed strategies increment quickly
but are frequently bound to get stuck in local optima. However, there is also
                                                
10
 A similar property is measured by Page (1996) as the “ascent size” of a problem.
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another interesting finding: in the very early stages, when simulated agents find
themselves in very poor areas of the landscape they are VORZHU than non
decomposed strategies. This is due to the fact that their moves out of “wells” have
a limited range as compared to non decomposed strategies. This result suggests an
interesting interpretation of the historical development of real world market
organizations. Typically, when a new product is just invented a vertically
integrated firm is the most common producer. Later a process of vertical
disintegration brings to introduce market interactions between producers who limit
their activities to portions of the whole production process.
3UREOHPVROYLQJZLWKFKDQJLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
So far we have supposed that the “structure” of the problem, i.e. the
representation of the space to be searched is exogenously given and cannot be
manipulated. But, as already mentioned, problem-solving does not only involve
search in a given space but also – and sometimes more importantly – a re-framing
of the problem itself. In this section we put forward a very preliminary
investigation of the properties of problem representations using the toolbox
developed in the previous sections. In particular, we show that changing
representations can generally be a more powerful problem-solving strategy then
searching possibilities generated within a given representation: decentralisation can
be increased if more “powerful” representations are built.
A UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of the problem ;≥ is a pair Ξä where:
/; →Ξ  is an HQFRGLQJ of the problem, which maps states into words of a
language /;
ä is a SUHIHUHQFHUHODWLRQ over possible configurations.
We assume that / is made of all and only the words (strings) of a fixed length
n over a binary alphabet: / {OO∈{}Q}. We also assume that the encoding Ξ is a
one-to-one mapping, i.e.:
1. Ξ[L≠Ξ[M∀L≠M
2. ∃O∈/O Ξ[L∀[L∈;
The preference relation ä is a “subjective” one which does not necessarily
coincide with the “objective” one ≥.
We suppose that agents do not know the “objective” problem, but only its
representation and therefore that it is the space defined by such representation
which is being searched with a given decomposition scheme.
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As a preliminary to a much deeper investigation which is still to be
undertaken, in the following we just mention three benchmark propositions which
together point to the fact that representations can be very powerful search tools.
This hints to a possible line of inquiry which considers the construction of shared
representations as one of the main functions accomplished by an organisation.
3URSRVLWLRQ : every problem (X, ≥) admits a representation (Ξ,ä) and a
decomposition scheme D(Ξ,ä) which can solve it.
3URRI given that we are considering finite problems, this proposition is trivial.
Consider in fact a representation (Ξ,ä) where Ξ is completely free and ä has the
only constraint of preserving the same global optimum as ≥. Clearly the
decomposition scheme D={{1,2,3,....., n}} will find such a global optimum in 2N
steps.
The next two propositions claim instead that the complexity of a problem, its
decomposability and the time required to solve it depend on its representation. In
fact, by modifying the encoding (proposition 6) and/or the preference relation
(proposition 7) we can transform any problem into one of minimum complexity.
Comparing proposition 5 with propositions 6 and 7 we are thus led to conclude that
acting on the representation can be a more powerful problem solving strategy than
acting on the solution algorithm for a given representation.
3URSRVLWLRQ: given any problem (X, ≥), it admits an encoding Ξ such that it can
be solved optimally with the decomposition scheme of minimum complexity
D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{n}}.
3URRI: we prove the proposition by constructing an encoding which has such a
property for a generic problem.
Consider the mapping Φ:X→N from the set of configurations into the set of
non-negative integers so defined:
( ) ( ) ( ) 0122210 ...      with 2  .....;  ;1  ;0 1 [[[[[[[ 111 1 ≥≥≥≥=Φ=Φ=Φ −
Define now the encoding ( ) ( )[ ]
L1L
[ELQ[ Φ=Ξ*  where 
1
ELQ  is a function
which maps an integer into a string of length N which gives its binary encoding
(filling with 0’s the missing bits). It is now very easy to verify, because of the
properties of binary encoding (i.e. every mutation from 0 to 1 always produces a
higher number), that Ξ* is an encoding which satisfies proposition 6.
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3URSRVLWLRQ : given any problem (X, ≥) and any encoding Ξ, there exist a
preference relation ä such that the problem can be solved optimally with the
decomposition scheme of minimum complexity D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{n}}.
3URRI: we prove also this proposition by construction. Let us call x* the point
corresponding to the global maximum of the fitness function, and let Ξ(x*)=l* be
its representation, with  O O O O
Q
* * * *
.....= 1 2
Any preference relation such that   
QL
OOOO ....... *21 ä QL OOOO .......21
QLOO
LL
,......,2,1     * =≠∀
satisfies proposition 7.
There is a different and more interesting sense in which problem
representations can be dealt with: it concerns the nature and representation of the
underlying structure of interdependencies. In Kauffman’s NK model
interdependencies (epistatic interactions) are assumed to have a random nature,
reflecting our ignorance on how in the biological realm epistatic interactions within
the genome do actually map into phenotipic characteristics. This allows Kauffman
to derive statistical properties of the population of random landscape, but these
properties do not necessarily reflect the properties of landscapes which are of
interest in some other domain in which we know more about the nature of
interdependencies. Short, for the time being, of a systematic analysis of the
mapping between the nature of interdependencies and the structure of the resulting
landscape, in the following we provide an example of a large family of problems in
which, in spite of the existence of strong interdependencies, there exists a “natural”
complete representation of the problem which makes it fully decomposable.
The example we are going to develop is represented by puzzles or games
which can be expressed in the form of deterministic transitions between states (for
a more extensive treatment of these puzzles and for some graph theoretic results
which are equivalent to ours see Egidi (2000)). States are characterised by a full
description of the configurations of the game (layout of cards in a solitaire,
positions of colours in a Rubik cube, etc.) including, in games which involve more
than one player, a variable which simply indicates whose turn is to move. We
assume that the game does not involve any random component in the transitions: it
might indeed involve hidden information and randomness with respect to the initial
configuration, as it usually happens in cards games, but a given move applied to a
given configuration must always cause the same transition.
Such puzzles can be fully described by:
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1. A finite VHW RI VWDWHV S∪W, where S={s1,s2,...,sn} is the set of non-terminal
states in which some move has to be performed and W={w1,w2,....wm} the set
of terminal or "winning" states, i.e. those in which the puzzle is successfully
solved or the game is won and no further moves should be performed. A subset
B⊆S of the possible initial states (for instance chess has only one starting state,
while in the Rubik cube all non-winning configurations can be starting ones).
We consider only games in which W can be reached from every state in B.
2. A finite VHWRIPRYHV M={m1,m2,...,mk}
3. A WUDQVLWLRQPDWUL[ T=[ tij] of dimension n×k in which the element tij∈S∪W
is the state which is reached from state i when move j is performed. Some
moves can be illegal at some states (i.e. violate the rules of the game), thus the
matrix T may contain empty cells. Alternatively, illegal moves can be modelled
by introducing an "illegal state" s0 which is reached from any other state when
an illegal move is performed and which terminates the game (no further moves
are allowed). We call S0={s0}∪S
A complete and deterministic playing SURJUDP 3 is a string of length n which
specifies one and only one move for all the non-winning states:
Q
LLL
PPP3
21
=   with   0P
ML
∈
Given a starting state si∈B, the program 3 determines a unique sequence of
states which can end up in:
1. one of the winning states wj, in this case we also compute the length of the
sequence of moves which the program has performed to reach wj (we call it
N_moves);
2. the illegal state s0 if an illegal move has been performed by the program;
3. an infinite loop if the sequence visits twice a state which is neither winning nor
illegal.
We call SHUIRUPDQFH of the program 3, with sj as a starting state, the couple
of integers (N_fail, N_moves). N_fail is set to 1 if the program fails to reach one of
the winning states or loops. N_moves is the number of moves that a program takes
to reach one of the winning states.
If we compute the performance of the program for all the possible starting
states, we can compute the global performance of P as the couple



∑ ∑
∈ ∈%V %V
VV
L L
LL
PRYHV1IDLO1 _,_ .
It is natural to assume the following lexicographic SUHIHUHQFH RUGHU on
programs:
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we say that program 3L is strictly preferred to program 3M and write ML 33 f
if:
a) N_fail(3L)<N_fail(3M)
or
b) N_fail(3L)=N_fail(3M) and N_moves(3L)<N_moves(3M)
we say that 3L and 3M are indifferent and write ML 33 ≈  if:
a) N_fail(3L)=N_fail(3M)
and
b) N_moves(3L)=N_moves(3M)
In this way we introduce a complete ranking over the space of all kn
programs, we refer to it as the ODQGVFDSHRIFRPSOHWHSURJUDPV.
2SWLPDOSURJUDPV we can partition S into subsets which are connected to W
by no less than 1,2,...,h moves11.
Such a partition can be constructed by including in a set S1 all and only the
states from which W can be reached with a single move, in a set S2 all and only the
states from which S1 can be reached with a single move, and so on...
More formally, the partition can be constructed recursively:
1 - build S1={si} for all the si such that there exists a tij∈W,
∀j=1,2,...,k
2 - set h=1
3 - repeat
         h = h + 1
         build Sh={si} for all the si∈S\S1\....\Sh-1 such that there exists a
tij∈Sh-1, ∀j=1,2,...,k
      until S\S1\S2\.....\Sh=∅
the resulting h is the length of the optimal program(s).
’HFRPSRVLQJDQGVHDUFKLQJWKHVSDFHRIFRPSOHWHSURJUDPV
In this section we show that the landscape of complete programs as defined
above:
                                                
11
 Of course for every state which is connected to W there must exist a path to W of at most
n-1 moves (i.e. which at most visits all the non-winning states), thus h≤n.
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1. is generally highly non-correlated, i.e. characterised by strong epistatic
interdependencies in the sense of Kauffman (1993) (i.e., Kauffman’s jargon, its
K is relatively high);
2. has always cover size h and ascent size 1 in the sense of Page (1996);
3. is always fully decomposable, in the sense defined in the previous sections, i.e.
one-bit mutation with selection always locates the global optimum.
The first statement can be easily checked numerically by building puzzles as
defined above and computing the correlation structure of the resulting landscapes
of complete programs. We found that using Weinberger’s autocorrelation measure
(cf. Weinberger (1991) and Kauffman (1993), p. 63), such landscapes have very
low correlation, that is the same correlation values of  NK landscapes whose K is
very close to N-1.
For the following two statements we provide instead a formal proof in
propositions 8 and 9.
3URSRVLWLRQ : the landscape of complete programs for a puzzle (S,W,M,T) has
ascent size 1 and cover size h (as defined in Page (1996)).
3URRI: consider the partition S=S1∪S2∪.....∪Sh introduced above and consider a
state si∈S1 . Since si∈S1 there must exist a move 
L
L
P  which connects si directly to
W, therefore mutating the move in the i-th position into 
L
L
P  always improves the
performance of a program regardless the configuration of the rest of the program.
This implies that the hyperplane  P 
L
L
  must be a dominant one.
Consider now the set S2 and suppose that sj∈S2 can be connected directly to si,
then the hyperplane  #...#...#...# **
LM LL
PP  must also be dominant, and so on until the
subset Sh is connected to Sh-1. Thus if h is the length of the optimal program(s), the
landscape of complete programs has a minimum size cover h and ascent size 1.
3URSRVLWLRQ : the landscape of complete programs for a puzzle (S,W,M,T) is
always fully decomposable, i.e. does not have local but not global optima with
respect to all possible one-bit mutations.
3URRI: this proposition can be proven as a corollary of proposition 8. Assume for
simplicity, but without loss of generality, that there exist a unique globally
optimum program:
****
...
21 QLLL
PPP3 =
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We show that for any other program 
Q
LLL
PPP3
21
= with at least one
*
MM LL
PP ≠ there always exists at least one mutation which gives a program of
higher rank.
Consider again the partition S=S1∪S2∪.....∪Sh , if P is such that at least one
state in S1 is not directly connected to W, than the performance of P can be
improved by making one mutation in such a way as to connect it directly to W,
regardless the current state of the rest of the program. If instead all states in S1 are
already directly connected to W, then we can repeat the same argument for the
connections  from S2 to S1, and so on until we connect states in Sh to the states in
Sh-1.
In order to better understand the implications of proposition 9, consider the
case in which the current program P is not the optimal one. We may have that some
moves in P, in spite of not being optimised, have no performance-improving
mutation available, which amounts to saying that these move have non-linear
epistatic links with other moves. Proposition 9 shows that nevertheless there
always exists at least one other move in the program P which can undergo a
performance improving mutation and, moreover, sooner or later these mutations
elsewhere in the program will make a performance improving mutation possible
also for those moves for which currently it does exist.
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